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THE CHANGING FACE OF BANKING
AND FINANCE: SOME LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS*
BY Roy GOODE*

It is a particular privilege to be invited to deliver the second Falconbridge
Lecture here at this distinguished law school, which is soon to celebrate
its official centenary.

John Delatre Falconbridge was associated with Osgoode Hall
for most of his long life, serving as Dean for no fewer than 24
years. A scholar of international repute, he covered an enormous
range. He was the author of major texts on conflict of laws, sale of
goods, mortgages of land, business law, negotiable instruments and
banking and bills of exchange, the last of which has recently been
republished in a superb new edition - indeed, it is a new book - by

C Copyright, 1989, Roy Goode. This is a revision of the Falconbridge Lecture delivered

at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, on 22 Oct. 1987.
* Crowther Professor of Credit and Commercial Law and Director of the Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London; Falconbridge Visiting
Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1987.
I should like to acknowledge my thanks to Mr. Thomas E. Cimeno Jr. and Mr. Paul
M. Connoly, Senior Vice Presidents of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for the very
helpful information and documents they supplied: to the Deans, law librarians and staff of the
University of Texas, Austin, Boston University, Harvard, Osgoode Hall and the University of
Toronto for making their facilities available and for all their help in the literature searches
which preceded the preparation of this lecture; to Messrs. Borden & Elliot, Toronto, for
generously supplying me with a copy of the Estey Report on the Collapse of the CCB and
Northland Bank; to Professor Hal Scott of the Harvard Law School for kindly giving me a
copy of the Report referred to at note 35 below; to Mr. Gordon Sedgwick, Q.C. for supplying
me with a copy of his paper referred to at note 40 below and other material; and to the many
other acquaintances, friends and colleagues who were so generous with their time in
accommodating my propensity for asking endless questions.
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Mr. Bradley Crawford.' Dean Falconbridge, a retiring man of whom
virtually no anecdotes survive, by his example laid the foundation for
what was to become a power-house of legal scholarship. It is fitting
that his memory should be kept alive in this annual lecture in his
honour.
What I shall seek to do in the time allotted me is to identify
some of the principal characteristics of modern banking; to discuss
the legal implications of evolving banking practice; and to indicate
how academic commercial lawyers might both give and receive
intellectual benefit from a study of developments in banking.
I. SOME- PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF MODERN BANKING
The last decade has witnessed a revolution in the provision
of banking services and in their regulation. We can identify at least
seven major developments.
A. The Opening up of Access to the FinancialMarkets
In the major financial centres of the world, the barriers to
entry into the financial markets are being steadily dismantled. This
movement towards increased competition has both an internal and
an external aspect. Internally it is reflected in the admission to the
market of non-banking financiers and financial intermediaries.
Externally, it manifests itself in the growing willingness to allow
foreign banks to compete with the home banks.
B. Deregulation and the Reduced Significance of Banking Status
An equally strong characteristic of modern banking is the
movement towards deregulation of financial services and the
replacement of statutory controls by administrative supervision. The
thrust for deregulation comes from the desire of governments to
1 B. Crawford & J.D. Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Erchange, 8th ed. (Aurora,
Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1986).
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promote competition and, at the international level, to attract
foreign business. Since effective competition is impaired if some
institutions are subject to rules that do not affect others, an aspect
of deregulation has been the removal of restrictions on activities in
which certain types of institution, such as banks and building
societies, are permitted to engage, and a movement away from
specialist financial organizations towards financial conglomerates
offering a wide package of services. The result is that banking
status, which traditionally has conferred various privileges such as
the right to designate oneself a banker, to accept deposits and to
maintain hidden reserves, is becoming of reduced importance. It is
significant that the United Kingdom Banking Act 1987 makes few
references to banks except in its short title; the statutory provisions
now refer to "authorised institutions," that is, institutions authorized
by the Bank of England to accept deposits.
C. Disintennediation
This hideous term, typical of the inelegance of modern
jargon, denotes a change in the role of banks from that of principal
in the money markets, borrowing from depositors and lending to
investors, to that of financial intermediary. This change has come
about through competitive forces. Borrowers discovered that they
could obtain funds more cheaply by borrowing direct from the
commercial sector; lenders, that they could obtain a greater return
on funds by lending direct to the market. Banks have thus shifted
their emphasis from direct lending to underwriting, broking and
packaging of deals for lenders and borrowers.
D. Securitization
Hand in hand with disintermediation goes securitization, a
process by which lenders package their financial assets and convert
them into marketable securities which are then issued either direct
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to the market or by placement.2 Securitization has been fuelled by
the change in the role of the banks, the desire to increase liquidity
by unloading medium- and long-term loans on to the market and the
wish to reduce assets so as to avoid having to increase capital
consequent upon the requirements of the regulatory authorities as
to capital-assets ratios. 3
E. Globalization of the Markets
A particular feature of modern finance is the
interdependence of the world's financial centres, the rapid movement
of funds from one centre to another and the development of Eurosecurities as instruments largely beyond the purview of national
regulatory systems.
F. Convergence of the Financialand Securities Markets
The securitization of financial assets has blurred the
distinction between the financial market and the securities market.
This convergence of the markets is becoming reflected in their
respective clearing systems, for both are moving sharply away from
paper-based transfers 4 and the electronic settlement of obligations
arising from dealings in securities is becoming increasingly integrated
with electronic funds transfer.

2 Securitization has been neatly defined as a scheme for selling tradeable participations
in pools of loans. See "Loan Transfers and Securitisation," Consultative Paper No. 8/87 issued

by the Banking Supervision Division of the Bank of England in December 1987. For a
discussion from an American perspective, see Logan elal., "The Securitization of U.S. Bank
Activities in the Eurodollar Market -- Issues for U.S. Counsel" (1986) 11 N.C.J. Intl. L. &
Com. Reg. 539.
3 For a description of the development and methods of securitization, see Recent
Innovations in InternationalBanking, a Report of the Study Group established by the Central
Banks of the Group of Ten Countries (Bank for International Settlements, April 1986).
4 See below.
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G. The Advent of New Technology
The movement away from paper initiated by the banks in the
transfer and clearing of funds is now gathering momentum in
relation to securities dealings with the development of book entry
systems of transfer. These are designed to dispense with transfer
instruments and to avoid the necessity for registration of changes of
ownership in the books of the issuing company where this results
from dealings between system participants.

II. THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN BANKING PRACICE
Where is all this leading to and what are the implications for
law and lawyers? There are, as it seems to me, at least three
consequences of the developments described above.
Firstly, we can see increased tensions between competing
objectives: competition and financial stability; competitive efficiency
and the maintenance of ethical standards; the advantages of scale
and the limiting of risk; the integration of financial services and the
regulation of conflicts of interest; the need for speed and the need
for care in the giving of advice and the preparation of documents.
An aspect of these tensions is the Janus-like approach of
governments to the role of the law in financial and securities
dealings. On the one hand, we have the move towards deregulation,
the freeing of financial institutions from many of the legal shackles
of the past in order to promote competition and keep down costs.
On the other hand, we have a recognition that standards of
behaviour in the market are not what they should be and that the
removal of barriers to access to the market will bring in players who
are not of the old school and who are more aggressive in their
marketing and less sensitive to ethical considerations than the blueblooded banking aristocracy; and that for these new players fresh
rules have to be devised which previously were considered
unnecessary.

Secondly, we are having to come to terms with the fact that
volatility of the markets is no longer the inevitable harbinger of
doom but is a fact of everyday life. This is a consequence of the
growth of huge conglomerates, the interdependence of the financial
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centres and of the ability of corporate treasurers, through modern
technology, to shift vast funds at the press of a button from one
centre to another to attract the highest return and avoid the
restrictions on hours of trading.
Thirdly, this volatility means that hanging over the financial
world is the threat of massive bank failures. The volume of funds
now capable of being processed in one of the major financial centres
is huge. The daylight exposure of a major bank pending end-of-day
settlement can amount to as much as eight or nine times its capital.
Investors and depositors have a touching faith in the assurance of
government support to prevent the failure of a major bank, but such
support can be expensive and its continuance by no means
inevitable. A striking example is to be found in the collapse of two
Alberta banks, the Canadian Commercial Bank and the Northland
Bank, which together received support from the Bank of Canada to
the tune of nearly $2 billion but ultimately went into liquidation
when the Bank of Canada and the commercial banks decided that
a further infusion of funds was not justified.s Concern for the
financial soundness of banks has become a major preoccupation of
central bankers, and vigorous attempts are being made not only to
tighten banking supervision and ensure the adequacy of capital
resources maintained by banks but to achieve increased
harmonization of capital adequacy standards. To that end the
central bank governors of the Group of Ten have endorsed the farreaching proposals of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation
and Supervisory Practices (otherwise known as the Cooke
Committee) for the convergence of national standards, 6 while the
European Community (Ec) Commission has presented a proposal

For a detailed description of the rise and fall of the two banks see Report of the Inquiry
into the Collapse of the CCB and Northland Bank (Minister of Supply and Services: Canada,

1986) by Mr. Justice Estey, who concluded (at 347) that the banks' problems resulted not
from inherent lack of required qualities in the administrators but in the inadequacies of the
structure of the regulatory establishment.

6 Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Proposalsfor international
convergence of capital measurement and capitalstandards, issued by the Bank for International

Settlements in July 1988.
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for a Second Banking Coordination Directive 7 and recommendations
on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit
institutions8 and the introduction of deposit-guarantee schemes in
the Community.9
It is against the background of the potential failure of one
or more major players in the market that I propose to examine
some of the issues of public law and private law that are likely to
arise in the new financial era. In deference to the Socratic style so
popular in North America I shall pose the questions rather than
attempt to answer them.
III. ISSUES OF PUBLIC LAW
A. The Implications of Deregulation
With deregulation comes the need for greater supervision.
Statutory rules carrying penal sanctions are replaced by membership
rules devised or approved by the regulatory authorities and enforced
by reprimand or by suspension or forfeiture of licence or
membership, with the consequent inability to trade in the market.
Activity is controlled less by legal requirements and restrictions than
by the exercise of administrative discretion in the formulation,
interpretation and enforcement of the rules of the game.
The efficiency of such a system varies inversely with the
length and complexity of its rule books. International financial
centres live by the service they offer the financial community, which
requires speed, simplicity, accuracy and reliability in the transacting
of business and the settlement of obligations. Self-regulation is most
easily achieved when the market is homogeneous and the players are
few and select. In such a milieu formal rules can largely be
dispensed with. One of the more striking features of British
7 EC Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the co-ordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC (COM(87)715 final, Brussels, 16 Feb. 1988).
8 87/62/EEC 22 Dec. 1986 (O.3. 4.2.87).
9 87163/EEC 22 Dec. 1986 (O-. 4.2.87).
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banking, astonishing to foreigners, was that for over 130 years it
operated with virtually no controlling legislation of any kind
whatever. Apart from exchange controls, later abolished, everything
was achieved by moral suasion; a polite letter from the Governor of
the Bank of England to the clearing banks indicating, for example,
that a reduction in the extension of consumer credit would be
appreciated was all that was needed, for no banker in his or her
right mind would buck the Bank of England.
Now, all that has changed, and though some would mourn
the passing of such a golden era, it was inevitable. For of course
the corollary of such a closed system is that although it facilitates
the maintenance of high standards of integrity and business
behaviour, it is also anti-competitive and relatively impervious to
change. The encouragement of competition, so necessary to healthy
economic growth, has also led to a breakup of the cohesion of the
banking industry, which now encompasses so wide a range of
business activity and such a disparate membership that we can no
longer say what we mean by a bank or by banking. The result,
inevitably, is a decline in ethical standards as the brash, confident
newcomers gradually come in to displace the traditional banker, with
little patience for the professional rules in which that banker was
nurtured; and with this comes the perceived need for control of
access to the markets, for more detailed rules, more closely
regulated procedures, so that paradoxically the main advantages of
deregulation, namely competition, freedom and flexibility, become
whittled away by an ever growing rule book designed to cater for
those who regard themselves as bound not by the spirit of the rules
but only by the letter.
B. The Deposit-takers
And this is where one of the first issues of public law begins
to surface. What institutions should be allowed to take deposits?
The primary concern here, of course, is the soundness and integrity
of the depositary institution. In regulatory folklore this was best
achieved by confinement of the deposit-taking power to specialized
institutions. Thus, in England a company which expanded its
activities significantly beyond those traditionally associated with
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banking, for example by substantial investment in non-banking
subsidiaries, was liable to meet with a refusal of its application to be
accorded banking status so as to entitle it to advertise for deposits;
in the United States the Banking Act 193310 sought to separate
investment banking from commercial banking by prohibiting national
banks from underwriting securities and investment banks from
accepting deposits, whilst the Bank Holding Act conferred on the
Federal Reserve Board power to restrict the ownership of banks by
securities firms, an irksome restriction which led to avoidance
through the phenomenon of the non-bank bank;11 and in Canada
the federal Bank Act restricts the ability of banks to engage in trade
and underwrite securities, whether directly or through a non-banking
subsidiary. 12 But times are changing, and with the pressure on
banks to increase profitability and find new sources of income, and
on financial centres to attract business and promote competition, the
legislatures are beginning to relax the old rules so as to allow
institutions of different kinds to compete on an equal footing. We
are now witnessing a movement away from restrictions on the types
of business in which a bank can engage towards a regime which
concentrates on the prudential management of the affairs of deposittaking institutions.
Concern for security necessarily means that a wide discretion
has to be conferred on the regulators to grant or refuse
authorization to accept deposits. The legislative provisions or
administrative rules may themselves embody a right of appeal against
refusal of authorization; but where no such right is given or where
an appeal is unsuccessful we can increasingly expect challenges by
disappointed parties by way of application for judicial review.13 The
10 § 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), ss. 16, 20, 21, 23. This part of the BankingAct is popularly
known as the Glass-SteagallAct.
11 These developments are well described by Golembe and Holland, FederalRegulation
of Banking 1986-87 (Washington, D.C.: Golembe Associates Inc., 1986) c. 4, 10.
12 Bank Act, S.C. 1980, c. 40, ss. 174, 190, 193. For a detailed analysis, see Crawford
& Falconbridge, supra, note 1 at c. 13, 16.

13 In England, it has recently been held that the Takeover Panel, though not a statutory
body but a mere unincorporated association entirely devoid of legal personality and of

common law or prerogative powers, is nevertheless susceptible to judicial review since it
exercises important public law functions and duties and wields great power R. v. Panel on
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question also arises whether a remedy in damages is available in
private law based on the tort of negligence or breach of statutory
duty, and if not, whether public law in common law jurisdictions will
develop to the point of enabling the courts to entertain claims for
compensation by applicants who have suffered loss through refusal
of authorization, where the regulatory authority has breached the
rules of natural justice or has acted wholly unreasonably or in a
manner inconsistent with the principles and rules it is charged to
14
apply.
C. Protection of Depositors
The perceived importance of maintaining confidence in the
integrity of the banking system has led in most countries to special
measures for the protection of bank depositors.1 5 Typically these
take one of two forms: a special priority for depositors vis-a-vis
other unsecured creditors in the winding up of the bank, and Stateregulated deposit insurance. Full insurance cover for a depositor is
open to the objection that it enables him or her to bank with the
institution offering the highest deposit rates without assuming any of
the attendant risks. Hence the United Kingdom Banking Act limits
the amount of a depositor's claim against the Deposit Protection
Fund to three-quarters of his protected deposit. 16
Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafinplc, [1987] 1 All E.R. 564.

14 The prospects of a successful claim in England are not auspicious. The conventional
view, recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Jones v. Department of Employment, [1988]
1 All E.R. 725, is that where the statute prescribes a procedure for appeal against an

administrative decision, the party concerned has no remedy in private law, only a remedy in
public law; and that the latter is limited to the prescribed procedure or judicial review. There
is now a sharp movement away from Antis v. Merton London Borough, [1978] A.C. 728 and
a growing reluctance to hold that public bodies or officers owe a duty of care actionable in

tort. See the recent decision of the Privy Council in Rowling v. Takaro PropertiesLtd., [1988]
1 All E.R. 163. Where judicial review is available, a claim for negligence would in any event
be limited to loss not avoided by the review;, that is, loss resulting from the delay elapsing
between the time of the order complained of and the time it is quashed by the court.
15 The vexed question what is a deposit receives no fewer than five pages of analysis in
Crawford & Falconbridge, supra, note 1 at 757-61.
16 Banking Act 1987 (U.K.), 1987, c. 22, s. 58(1). By "protected deposit" is meant the
depository institution's liability to the depositor up to a maximum of £20,000 (s.60(1)).
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Do the regulatory authorities owe any legal duty to existing
or prospective depositors? Could a depositor or other creditor of
a bank which failed assert a claim against the authorities for
negligence in granting an authorization which ought not to have
been granted or in failing to exercise due care and diligence in the
execution of their supervisory functions? Such a claim could
conceivably be founded either on the tort of negligence 1 7 or on
breach of statutory duty, though the courts are unlikely to view it
with enthusiasm, 18 particularly where the relevant legislation
19
prescribes an appeal procedure.
D. Protection of Other Investors
The development of financial conglomerates and the
expansion of financial services have brought in their train a
perceived need for regulation in the interests of investors going far
beyond deposit protection. The u.K. Financial Sen'ices Act 1986
provides a complex structure of self-regulation of the securities
industry within a statutory framework. The principal regulator is the
Securities and Investments Board (SIB), which operates under rules
approved by and powers delegated by the Secretary of State. SIB
in turn is responsible for exercising general control over the various
self-regulating organizations (SROs) and approving their rules. No
20
one will be allowed to carry on regulated investment activities

17 Which currently in England is somewhat on the retreat, with a distinctly cooler judicial
attitude to cases such as Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 and Junior
Books Co. Ltd. v. Veitchi Co., [1983] A.C. 520. See, for example, Muirhead v. hdustrial Bank
Specialities Ltd., [1986] Q.B. 507; Yuen Kun-yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1987] 2 All

E.R. 705.
18 See Yuen Kun-yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, ibid, where the Privy Council
upheld decisions of the Hong Kong High Court and Court of Appeal striking out a claim for
negligence against the Commissioner of Deposit-taking Companies as disclosing no cause of
action. See also the cases referred to at note 14, supra.
19 See supra, note 14.
20 This covers dealing in investments, arranging deals in investments, managing
investments, advising on investments and establishing, operating or winding up collective
investment schemes (FinancialServices Act 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 60, s. 1(2) and Sch. 1, Part

11).
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unless authorized or exempt. 21
Authorization, where not
automatic, 22 is obtained by membership of an SRO, by membership
of and certification by a recognized professional body or by direct
authorization from SIB. The Act contains various rules designed to
ensure the proper conduct of investment business and these are
buttressed by a mass of rules from siB23 and the SROs which threaten
to engulf the securities industry in a tidal wave of regulatory detail
which will inevitably involve substantial expense and some loss of
efficiency. A separate statute prohibits insider dealing.24 Various
civil remedies are given to investors, in addition to which SIB is given
power to apply for injunctions and restitution orders. All this makes
a field day for lawyers, and can be expected (inter alia) to accelerate
still further the growth of administrative law in the banking field.
IV. ISSUES OF PRIVATE LAW
The evolution of new and constantly changing financial
instruments and mechanisms provides a rich fare for the academic
lawyer who wishes to sharpen his or her perception of basic
concepts of contract and property law. Many of these centre on the
impact of a party's insolvency, which is the point at which the
distinction between proprietary and personal rights is likely to
become significant.
There are three sets of issues in the sphere of private law to
which I should like to direct your attention, namely the
characterization of a transaction involving the sale of financial assets,

21 Ibid., s. 3.

22 For example, for authorized insurers and for "Euro-persons."
23 Among which are the restriction of claims to offer independent services, a prohibition
on excessive charging and "churning" (changing a client's investments with excessive frequency
to earn commission), a "know your customer" rule, a "suitability' (of a particular transaction
for the particular customer) rule, a written customer agreement, a best advice and best
execution requirement, a restriction on self-dealing and a requirement for the disclosure of
material interests and commissions. See Rider, Chaikin & Abrams, Guide to the Financial
Services Act 1986 (Bicester, Eng.: CCH Editions, 1987) c. 6.
24 Company Securities (InsiderDealing)Ac4 1985 (U.K.), 1985, ¢. 8.
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the legal impact of clearing systems, and the liability of banks on the
insolvency of their non-banking subsidiaries.
A. Characterizationof Agreements
I will select by way of illustration two forms of financing, the
sub-participation and the sale and repurchase of securities. The
former is widespread; the latter, known in the vernacular as a repo,
has developed strongly in recent years in the United States. In each
case the question arises whether the transaction confers on the
buyer 25 a proprietary right over an asset of the seller or merely a
personal right against the seller. Sub-participations and repos
provide yet another example of how important it is for the practising
lawyer to have a thorough understanding of fundamental legal
concepts, which surface again and again with the development of
new financing techniques, and which in the process of reexamination become more refined and sophisticated.
B. Sub-participation
There are three principal ways in which a lead bank or other
seller can unload financial assets, namely assignment (sale of the
asset to the buyer), novation (buyer becomes the creditor in place
of seller) and sub-participation. In a funded sub-participation 26 the
buyer (sub-participant) agrees to deposit with the seller (original
lender) a sum of money representing an agreed proportion of the
amount advanced or to be advanced by the seller to the borrower,
the buyer acquiring in exchange a right to receive from the seller a
sum equal to the same proportion of the amount repaid by the
borrower.
The question I wish to consider is the effect of the
insolvency of the seller on the buyer (a) as to money received from
25 For brevity the term seller will be used to denote the party who confers or transfers
rights related to a financial asset owned by it and the term buyer will be used to denote the

party who makes a payment to the seller to acquire those rights.
26 As opposed to a sub-participation in the form of a guarantee, which I shall not discuss.
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the borrower for which no payment has been made to the buyer,
and (b) as to money payable by the borrower to the seller but not
yet paid. The answer to this question depends on the nature of the
agreement between seller and buyer. There are at least four
possible ways of characterizing the transaction. Firstly, it may be
treated as an outright assignment (sale) of the seller's rights against
the borrower.2 7 Secondly, it may be categorized as a sub-loan (or
back-to-back loan) by the buyer to the seller on the security of the
receivable held by the seller. Both these forms of agreement confer
on the buyer a proprietary interest in the loan asset and thus give
the buyer direct rights against the borrower, whether directly or
through the seller. 28 Thirdly, it may be an unsecured sub-loan by
the buyer to the seller to be repaid only when and to the extent
that the seller receives payment of the loan from the borrower, the
buyer having no rights over the loan asset and no relationship with
the borrower. Finally, it may be the "purchase" by the buyer of a
right against the seller to payment of a sum of money measured by
reference to the sum received by the seller from the borrower.
Prima facie a sub-participation falls into the last category.
The lead bank as seller usually makes great efforts to exclude any
relationship between buyer and borrower and any proprietary
interest of the borrower in the loan asset. So, typically the buyer
neither purchases the asset nor lends against a mortgage or charge
of the asset. Nor will the transaction normally constitute a sub-loan
by buyer to seller. This is because the sum which the buyer is
entitled to receive in the usual sub-participation is measured not by
the amount it deposits with the seller but by a due proportion of
the amount the seller receives from the borrower. In other words,
the buyer's entitlement is not to repayment of its deposit with
interest but to payment of a sum equal to a due proportion of the
amount repaid by the borrower to the seller. The buyer thus pays
its deposit to obtain a claim on the seller for a sum equal to x per
cent of the seller's receipts. The buyer has no interest in the
27 It is customary to speak of the sale of a participation but this term is used in a
commercial, not a legal sense, and though capable of indicating an assignment of the seller's
rights against the borrower, could (and usually does) refer to the conferment on the buyer
only of rights against the seller.

28 Depending on whether the assignment is legal (statutory) or equitable.
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receipts themselves; they merely provide the measure of its claim on
the seller.
Where does this leave the buyer? It has a double credit
risk: insolvency of the borrower and insolvency of the seller. It can
safeguard itself by requiring the seller (if the latter is willing) to
make a declaration of trust in favour of the buyer. Several points
arise in connection with this. Firstly, there has to be an intention
to create a trust. Secondly, a trust requires an identified subjectmatter. If the seller collects payment by way of set-off and becomes
bankrupt without passing on a due proportion, the buyer cannot
assert a trust, for there is no res to which this can attach. 29 Thirdly,
there must be a duty on the seller to segregate receipts from the
borrower as an identified trust fund. There can be no trust if the
seller is permitted to treat the receipts as its own and mingle them
with its other moneys. 30 Finally, if a trust is established, it is a
question of construction whether this is limited to sums actually
received from the borrower (in which case any unpaid part of the
debt vests in the seller's trustee) or whether it extends to the unpaid
debt itself. As an alternative to a trust established by the seller,
which has sometimes been held to exist,31 the seller may transfer
the assets to a separate subsidiary to hold on trust for subparticipants. The question then is whether the transfer and ensuing
trust can withstand a claim to pierce the corporate veil and treat the

assets as still those of the seller. These issues
deserve further study
32
by both academic and practising lawyers.

29 Hibernian NationalBank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Co., 733 F.2d 1403 (1984).
30 Ibid.; Henry v. Hammond, [1913] 2 K.B. 515; Re Bond Worth Ltd., [1980] Ch. 228 at

261.
31 For an example, see Re Canadian Commercial Bank, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 531.
32 A significant amount of work has already been done. See, for example, E. Behrens
(1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1117; D. Desjardins, (1986) Can. Bar Rev. 224; J.P. Carver, "I'he
Development of the Market in Syndicated Loan and Acceptance Credits: Some Legal Pitfalls
and Their Solution" in Current Issues of International Financial Law, Pierce et aL, ed.

(Singapore: Faculty of Law, University of Singapore, 1985) at 313-14; Penn, Shea & Arora,
Law and Practiceof InternationalBanking at para. 8.06; P. Gabriel, Legal Aspects of Syndicated
Loans (London: Butterworths, 1986) at 199; and, for a penetrating recent analysis of the
above and other possible characterizations, J.S. Ziegel, "Characterisation of Loan Participation
Agreements" (1988) 14 C.B.LJ. 336.
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C. Sale and Repurchase (Repo)
In the typical repo operation a party holding a portfolio of
securities sells an undivided interest in the portfolio to another and
simultaneously agrees to repurchase the securities, or to buy an
equivalent amount of similar securities, at a premium at a later
date. 33 The repurchase price is fixed, and thus does not depend on
the value of the securities at the time of repurchase; and the repo
may be rolled over for successive periods, which can be as short as
a day. A proliferation of transfer and retransfer documents is
avoided by use of the book-entry system for repo securities, and
special rules govern the transfer of title and the perfection of
security interests 4 Is the sale and repurchase what it purports to
be or is it a thinly disguised secured loan? If the latter, does the
"purchaser" acquire an effective security interest and how is this to
be perfected? Again, it is the insolvency of the seller which makes
the problem more than academic, for if the transaction is a secured
transaction it will be invalid against the seller's bankruptcy trustee
unless duly perfected.
D. The Legal Impact of ClearingSystems
Most substantial funds transfers are effected either through
a bank clearing or by a series of bilateral debits and credits in the

For a more detailed description and discussions of the legal problems, see W. F.
Hagerty IV, "Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo Market: Characterisation of
Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities" (1985) 37 Vand. L.R. 401 and literature
there cited.

34 See Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] s. 8-313 (which deals with title
transfers) and Federal Treasury regulations (which deal with the grant of security interests
in U.S. government book-entry securities and partially displace Art. 9 of the U.C.C.), and see
below. The extent to which the seller's acquisition of a proprietary interest in the securities
depends on their identification varies according to the legal system applicable to the

transaction. In America an agreement to transfer a given quantity of securities forming an
undivided part of a fungible bulk is effective to give the buyer a proportionate interest in the
bulk (U.C.C. s. 8-313(1)(d) and Official Comment, para. 5). In England this would not
suffice; the seller would have to transfer a part interest in the bulk, and if he merely

purported to transfer an unsegregated quantity of securities forming part of the fungible bulk
he would be an unsecured creditor.
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accounts of the transferor and transferee banks with the central
bank. I have earlier drawn attention to the magnitude of the
daylight exposure of clearing banks in major financial centres,
resulting from the capacity of electronic systems to process vast
numbers of transactions very rapidly, so that a bank may find that
the value of payment instructions it has implemented during business
hours greatly exceeds the value of its receipts during the same
period. This is a problem of growing concern to central bankers.
In America, funds transfer overdrafts are controlled by bilateral
limits and caps, and consideration is now being given to the problem
of the book-entry overdraft which results from a bank's same-day
settlement obligations for buyers exceeding the value of securities it
transfers for same-day settlement by other banks.3 S On both sides
of the Atlantic the authorities have addressed themselves to the
possible impact of a bank or systems failure and to the legal
effectiveness of purchase-money security interests taken by
custodians and clearing agents to secure recoupment of outlays for
which they commit themselves on behalf of customers? 6 Book-entry
transfers generate both payment and delivery exposure. The seller
and its bank are exposed to the risk of non-payment, the buyer and
its bank to the risk of non-delivery of the securities after payment
has been made. The book-entry system is so constructed that
transfer and payment are required to be simultaneous. However,
the selling bank is exposed to the risk of non-delivery as regards
transfer messages it sends on behalf of a selling customer before it
has taken delivery of the seller's security, whilst the buyer banker is
exposed to the risk of non-payment as regards payment messages by
which it commits itself to the seller bank in advance of being put in
funds by its customer. In the former case, the requisite amount of
securities has to be obtained to cover the delivery obligation and in

35 For a detailed discussion of the problem and alternative solutions, see the Report of

the Working Group of the Association of Reserve City Bankers on Book-Entry Daylight
Overdrafts (Association of Reserve City Bankers, June 1986).
36 In America such security interests are regulated partly by the Federal Treasury
regulations and partly by Art. 9 of the U.C.C.. In the United Kingdom a settlement bank's

exposure in the Central Gilts Office System is typically covered by a floating charge taken by
the bank over the government securities it receives for its customer and over its customer's
receivables in respect of subsequent resales of securities.
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the latter the bank has to advance the money on behalf of its
customer. The dealers operate on funds borrowed from the banks
who in turn incur intra-day overdrafts to the central bank which are
required to be zeroed by the end of the day. Dealers also cover
their delivery obligations by borrowing securities or by buying them
on repo terms (reverse repo).
The importance of clearing systems and system rules in
determining the legal rights of the various participants is ony now
coming to be appreciated by academic and practising lawyers. 3" The
advent of electronic clearing and transfer systems raises a host of
difficult questions which have yet to be resolved by the courts. At
what point does a payment message become irrevocable? When and
where does an actual transfer of funds take place? 38 In a chain of
dealings in book-entry securities, who owns what at any particular
stage? And who carries the risk of failure of a participant? These
are questions to which banks would do well to address themselves
and to provide solutions, by way of contract if they can, for
otherwise the legislature or the courts will have to do it for them
and they will not necessarily like the results.
E. Legal Liability of a Bank for Its Non-banking Subsidiaries
The final topic in the field of private law to which I should
like to refer is the possible legal liability of a bank for the debts and
A pioneer in the field is Professor Hal Scott, who devised a comprehensive New
Payments Code, an ambitious and scholarly text designed to cover all payment systems and
to replace Arts. 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.. (See H.S. Scott, "Corporate Wire Transfers and the
Uniform Payments Code," (1983) 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1664.) This project met with hostility
from the banking community and has been abandoned in favour of a more modest Art. 4A
restricted to payment by wire transfer. For an up-to-date description and details of other
relevant literature, see B. Geva, "The Evolving Law of Payment by Wire Transfer -- An
Outsider's View of Draft UCC Article 4A" (Address to the Seventeenth Annual Workshop
on Commercial and Consumer Law at the University of Toronto, October 1987) (1988) 14
C.B.LJ. 186.
38 1 have made some attempts myself to provide a conceptual framework of rules
governing these two issues. See Payment Obligationsin Commercial andFinancialTransactions
(London: Sweet & Maxwell and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 1983) and R.M. Goode,
"Electronic Funds Transfer as an Immediate Payment System" in R.M. Goode, ed., Electronic
Banking: The Legal Implications (London: Institute of Bankers and Centre for Commercial
Law Studies, 1985).
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defaults of its non-banking subsidiaries. The subject of lenders'
liability is assuming growing importance. The American Practising
Law Institute has devoted a complete handbook to the subject 39 and
Mr. Gordon Sedgwick has identified no fewer than a dozen possible
causes of action against a bank in a list which does not claim to be
exhaustive. 40 My concern is with one particular aspect only: the
possible liability of a bank when one of its non-banking subsidiaries
fails.
Received wisdom is, of course, that the question is of
theoretical interest only, since no bank would risk its reputation by
disclaiming responsibility for its failed subsidiary's obligations.
However, in the present-day world a parent's voluntary assumption
of the burden of discharging its subsidiary's obligations can no longer
be taken for granted. Indeed, unless such action were genuinely and
reasonably perceived as being in the interests of the parent its
directors would be guilty of breach of duty in applying shareholders'
funds to the discharge of the obligations of what in law is a separate
legal entity for whose debts the parent is not responsible. In the
United Kingdom the principle of Salomon v. Salomon retains its full
vigour and the courts remain reluctant to pierce the corporate veil.
The parent bank may, however, be at greater risk from a different
source of liability, namely that imposed on directors and shadow
directors41 for participation in wrongful trading.42 A parent bank
which intervenes too closely in the management of its subsidiary
may find itself labelled a de facto director or a shadow director so
as to attract potential liability for wrongful trading, with a
concomitant obligation to make such contribution to the subsidiary's

39 Lender Liability Litigation: Recent Developments (New York: Practising Law Institute,

1987).
40 G. Sedgwick Q.C., "Lender Liability:

Protection and Precautions for Lenders"

(Address to a conference on lenders' liability, Toronto, November 1987) [unpublished].
41 A shadow director is "a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the

directors of the company are accustomed to act (but so that a person is not deemed a shadow
director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him [or her] in a professional
capacity)" (Insolvent), Act 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45, s. 251).
42 Ibid., s. 214.
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assets on winding up as the court thinks proper.43 Where the
subsidiary is run entirely for the benefit of the parent and its de jure
directors are directors of the parent or mere puppets of the parent
board, the parent bank may be susceptible to claims on the basis
that the subsidiary is its agent or is a mere instrumentality for
implementing the parent's will. 44 These issues are not, of course,
peculiar to banks, but may be expected to surface more frequently
in the field of banking as banks move into other areas of business
and finance their non-banking subsidiaries.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The new banking regimes and instruments pose a range of
difficult legal issues of public and private law which have hitherto
been inadequately explored. I have endeavoured to depict some of
the more important of these, and if I have succeeded in provoking
some interest in the subject by those who have not previously had
occasion to think about it I am content.
In thanking you once again for the honour you have done
me in inviting me to deliver this, the second Falconbridge Lecture,
I must express my admiration of your attentiveness during the past
hour despite the fact that a luncheon awaits from which I must keep
you no more than a moment longer.
In such debates and analyses as have been generated, most
of the running has until recently been made by the practitioners, and
with a few honourable exceptions academic commercial lawyers have
tended to keep out of the field, whether from ignorance, lack of
curiosity or an understandable fear of the legal complexities. But
academics have much both to learn and to contribute in this as in
other fields of law. The raw material with which practitioners work
to solve specific problems for particular clients can be fashioned by
law teacher for their own purposes in teaching and research, for it
enables them to see the role of established principles in an
43 Ibid. s. 214(1).
44 Such claims are more likely to meet with success in the United States, which now has
a substantial body of jurisprudence on these issues, than in England, where the case law
remains sparse.
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unfamiliar setting and thereby strengthens their understanding of
them and their ability to impart to their students theoretical
concepts in the context of contemporary practices and problems.
Working together in fruitful collaboration law teachers and
practitioners can help each another, each group drawing on the
other's expertise to enrich its knowledge of its own field. As a
scholar of international standing, keenly interested in business
practice and responsible over many years for what was then a
professional law school, Dean Falconbridge would surely have
approved.

